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In 2017, the the world first heard of horrific human rights violations against the Uighur people of Xinjiang, in the northwest quarter of China. An estimated 1.5 million
people, out of a total ethnic Uyghur population of 12 million
people in China, have been interned in approximately 380 "re-education" camps
. The region has been turned into
a police state, with people sent to prison for refusing
to drink alcohol, or praying regularly. The Chinese government has made it all but impossible to buy knives and scissors
, Uighur people must pass through three to four checkpoints
every kilometer, half of all
families are assigned a policy spy who regularly makes house-visits, and a technological panopticon
of unprecedented proportions is taking place. Birth rates have fallen by one third
, because of forced sterilizations
and a desire to not bring up children in a prison.
Today's podcast episode is not about the ethnic cleansing taking place in Xinjiang, but rather a look at the historical circumstances that have led us to this point. In part one, I will discuss the process through which the Uighur people were incorporated into the Chinese state under the Qing dynasty. In part two, I discuss the policies of the government under Mao Zedong, especially the policy of mass Han settlement that created anger and resentment among Uighurs. Finally, in part three, I will discuss the cycle of protest and violence that led to the current human right abuses.
In 1755, the Qianlong Emperor, ruler of China ordered his army to exterminate
the Dzungar people, descendants of the Mongols, in what is Xinjiang today. 600,000 Dzungars were killed by Qing forces, with the remnants succumbing to disease or fleeing soon afterwards. The violent extermination of the Dzungar people, and the incorporation of Xinjiang, was part of the broader process of Qing Dynasty expansion westwards. At this point in time, the Uyghur did not yet exist as a distinct people. However, there were large numbers of settled farmers living in the oasis towns of the Tarim Basin who spoke Turkic languages and practiced the Islamic faith. These peoples rebelled against Dzungar rule and allied with the Qing in their conquest and extermination of the Dzungar people, and rapidly expanded into northern Xinjiang that had historically few Uighur.
During the 17th and 18th century, the Qing Empire expanded rapidly westward, incorporating modern Tibet and Mongolia into the Qing state. The period also an unprecedented quadrupling
of Chinese population, in part due to the adoption of new world crops. The Qing Empire encouraged mass settlement of ethnic Han westwards. Tensions with older populations
), especially Hui peoples (Muslims, but ethnically similar to Han Chinese), led to some of the most brutal wars in recorded history, with over 15 million losing their lives in these conflicts. In Xinjiang a brutal three way war between ethnic Han, Hui and Uighurs led to absolute devastation.
It was during this region that Xinjiang, which translates to New Territories, was created as a province. Southern Xinjiang, the Tarim Basin, remained overwhelmingly Uighur but northern Xinjaing was populated by a mix of Uighurs, Hui, Kazakhs and ethnic Han. The military had a large garrison, settling substantial numbers of farmer soldiers in the region. While the Qing state formally annexed Xinjiang into the Chinese state, local elites wielded day to day power. Indeed, as Qing power declined and China became dominated by warlords, local governors developed a policy of deliberately isolating
the region so as to keep destabilizing outside forces away from Xinjiang. However, Soviet influence and later control from China would completely transform these traditional relationships.
Xinjiang was incorporated into the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, marking a fundamental shift in the trajectory of Xinjiang. One of the most important aspects is the changing nature of ethnic identity. The Soviet model of governance put a great emphasis on defining and taxonomizing ethnicity. The settled Muslim Turkic people of oasis in Central Asia have not historically had a fixed identity. There was no clear differentiation
between other settled Muslim Turks such as Uzbeks and Uighurs, and the boundaries between nomadic Turkic group such as the Kazakhs were less clearly defined. The imposition of a much harder border between the USSR and China severed many of these connections. At the same time, the Chinese state tried to
co-opt the budding religious and nationalist movements of the region by taking actions such as creating patriotic religious associations.
Further strengthening the sense of ethnic Uyghur identity, and undermining Chinese attempts to win Uighur loyalty, was a massive influx of ethnic Han into Xinjiang from the 1960s to the 1980s. Between 1949 and 1980, the ethnic Han share of Xinjiang's population increased from 7% to 40%
. The driving force behind the rising share of Xingiang's ethnic Han population was the Xinjiang Production and Construction corps, known in Chinese as the Bingtuan or corps. Relations between the USSR and the PRC were strained
, with the two countries coming close to war on multiple occasions. The Bingtuan's purpose was to settle large numbers of veterans
, working as farmers or in other professions in peacetime, but ready to mobilize in case of war. The overwhelming majority of ethnic Han settlers lived in northern Xinjiang, a region that historically had a multi-ethnic society, while the oasis of southern Xinjiang remained overwhelmingly Uyghur. Unsurprisingly, there were major tensions between ethnic Han and ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang. For example, during the cultural revolution
mosques were burned, and cemeteries desecrated.
Tensions between Uyghurs and Hans have only intensified since liberalization. Xinjaingwas seen as a hardhip post, and the booming coastal cities have drawn for more ethnic Han than the distant frontier, with the ethnic Han share of the population staying constant between 1980 and 2010
. However, economic disparities between Uyghur and Han have grown dramatically since the beginning of liberalization. For example, the Bingtuan currently grows massive amounts of cotton and other crops on its farm. However, the Bingtuan has privileged
access to land and water, forcing many Uyghur
to become sharecroppers. Moreover, while senior administrative positions in Xinjiang often go to ethnic Uyghur, there is a parallel Communist party bureaucracy where real power
lies. Since the early 2000s, the central government has invested heavily through its "Western Development" scheme in Xinjiang.
However, the fruits of this investment have not been evenly distributed. For example, the National Petroleum Company has hired almost the entirety of the staff necessary for running the regions substantial oil reserves from outside the region. Moreover, there are massive differences in access to high quality formal private sector
jobs. One study on phone call backs found the call back rate on identical resumes nearly double
for Han than for Uyghurs, with the greatest disparities in ethnic Han owned private companies. The result of all of these factors are massive disparities between Han and Uyghur. According to 2005 mid-census data, ethnic Han incomes were nearly two and a half
times ethnic Uyghur incomes. In urban areas, Uyghurs earned 30% less despite having the same level of education as Han.
Unsurprisingly, Uyghur resentment has turned into peaceful, and in some cases violent opposition. Throughout the 1990s peaceful protests
against discrimination, and for autonomy and in some cases for independence became increasingly common. However, violent insurgency
also emerged. Insurgents briefly took over the township of Baren in April of 1990, and Xinjiang suffered a bombing campaign by terrorists. The government used brutal tactics, including a massacre
of hundreds at Ghulja to put down this incipient revolt. The government launched a strike hard
campaign in 1997 that severely disrupted all organized opposition to the state, and from the late 1990s onwards opposition to Chinese domination would take the form of mobs and lone wolf terrorist attacks.
A car ramming resulted in the death of 18 police officers in the city of Kashgar just before the 2008 Olympics. In July of 2009, protests against the death of two Uyghur men at the hands of a Chinese mob in Guangdong turned into indiscriminate violence against ethnic Han in Urumqi. Knife wielding Uyghur terrorists killed 31 people in the city of Kunming, well outside Xinjiang. Many other violent incidents made Xinjiang feel increasingly insecure. However, it is important to emphasize that there was little organization behind these violent acts, and little risk of the state losing control. While some Uyghur dissidents have established contacts with radical international Islamists, it seems that connections between radicals and Uyghurs have been caused
rather than hindered by government repression.
Since Xi Jinping assumed power, abuses of human rights have grown more and more common. Human rights lawyers have been imprisoned
, Christian churches
have faced, and censorship
has grown more intense. The greatest victims of the growing willingness to opresss have been Muslims, especially Uighurs. In 2014, the government launched a new strike hard
campaign in Xinjiang. In 2017, Chen Quangguo was appointed the Communist Party Secretary. He was previously noted for the harshness of his repression of Tibet. After taking command
of Xinjiang, the government hired more police in one year than in the previous seven. Xi Jinping, Chen Quangguo and the Chinese Communist Party thus began constructing a monstrous apparatus of oppression in Xinjiang.
The purpose of today's podcast episode is not to discuss the current ethnic cleansing campaign in Xinjiang. However, I wanted to conclude this podcast episode with the steps currently being taken to assist the Uyghur people. The state department in some ways has been active in the issue. Sanctions have been placed
on Chen Quangguo and other top officials in the crackdown. Similarly, sanctions have been placed on the Bingtuan. New regulations barring the import of goods made with forced labor
in Xinjiang have been placed. There is scope for expanding sanctions, such as banning any cotton made in Xinjiang. However, I feel it is more important to make it clear to the government of China that these sanctions are first and foremost about the human rights of Uyghur people, and not about other differences with China. Moreover, I think it is essential to create a broad international coalition. For example, Japan is moving towards adopting an act similar to the Magnitsky act to sanction human rights violations in Hong Kong. Steps
can be taken to encourage Japan to use these powers against those offending Uyghur human rights as well. However, much more action needs to be taken to get Muslim countries, who have overwhelmingly been silent
on the issue, to take a stance against Xi Jinping's oppression of Muslims.
Ultimately, it is likely that there is little that can be done through sanctions to protect Uyghur people. We need to be willing to massively increase the number of asylum seekers and refugees we will take. However, the Trump administration has been notably harsh on asylum seekers, including Uyghurs
. We need to live up to the words on the pedestal of the statue, and taken in the world's huddled masses yearning to be free.
- Selected Sources: China, imperial: 8. Qing or Manchu dynasty period, 1636–1911
, HENRY CHOI SZE HANG Brainwashing, Police Guards and Coercive Internment: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s “Vocational Training Internment Camps” , Adrian Zenz China’s Population Expansion and Its Causes during the Qing Period, 1644–1911
, Kent Deng THE TUNGAN REBELLION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CAUSES OF THE MUSLIM REBELLION IN MIDNINETEENTH CENTURY NORTHWEST CHINA
, Lewis Oeksel Neo Oasis: The Xinjiang Bingtuan in the Twenty-first Century
, Thomas Cliff The Kings of Xinjiang: Muslims Elites and the Qing Empire
, David Brophy Maximizing Soviet Interests in Xinjiang The USSR’s Penetration in Xinjiang from the Mid-1930s to the Early 1940s
, Liao Zhang The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, Gardner Bovingdon ‘Old Bottle, New Wine’? Xinjiang Bingtuan and China’s ethnic frontier governance
, Yuchao Zhu & Dongyan Blachford Defining Shariʿa in China: State, Ahong, and the Postsecular Turn
, Matthew S. Erie Commanding the Economy: The Recurring Patterns of Chinese Central Government Development Planning among Uyghurs in Xinjiang
, Henrik Szadewski Ethnic discrimination in China's internet job board labor market, Margraret Mauzer-Fazio Ethnic stratification amid China's economic transition: evidence from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
, X Wu, X Song Charting the Course of Uyghur Unrest
, Justin V Hastings www.wealthofnationspodcast.com https://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/China_Uighur.mp3